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 Socialization and Institutionalization Effects 
on Immigrants’ Social Trust 
 
BOGDAN VOICU 
 
 
 
Trust can be conceived as a manifestation of social capital1 as well as a 
moral value2. At individual level, its formations is seen either as product of 
early socialization which acts as a stable trait over ones’ life, either as shaped by 
continuous exposure to culture and institutions3. In the social capital debate, the 
discussion of “social capital regimes”4 and cultures of participation5 stresses the 
societal embeddedness of both trust6 and sociability. In the sociology of values, 
two main sets of theories address contextual determinants of value formation 
and change7. The socialization hypothesis8 assumes that values form during 
early socialization. The institutionalization hypothesis9 claims that the 
institutional settings determine changes over the entire lifespan. This paper asks 
what happens with individuals when move from a context to another? My 
answer is that trust is a stable trait, in the sense that it is determined by the 
culture of primary socialization, but it also is adaptive to the culture of trust that 
exists in the society where one resides. 
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Immigration provides a vast “natural experiment”10 that can be employed 
to study the process. Lacking panel data to assess if individuals change their 
levels of social trust when moving from one society to another, one may 
compare migrants to similar individuals who did not migrate. They might be 
either stayers (people from emigration countries who continue to live in their 
country of origin) or natives (non-migrants in immigration countries). Such 
people share with immigrants their exposure to either the culture of origin or the 
culture of current residence. One may also want to compare immigrants with 
other immigrants of different origin and the same host society. Therefore, there 
are three relevant comparisons: immigrants-stayers, immigrants-natives, 
immigrants-other immigrants. Simultaneously testing for them with cross-
sectional data is feasible if one employs cross-classified multilevel analyses, 
and has access to information on indicators describing social trust cultures in 
both origin and host societies. To do so, I use datasets provided by the value 
surveys, particularly the 2008 wave of the European Values Survey (EVS). 
Scholars dealing with international migrants’ levels of social trust have 
addressed the topic in recent studies11. Dinesen12 and Dinesen and Hooghe13 
proved that, in the case of international migrants, both origin and host societies 
play a role in determining social trust. I go further and I test simultaneously the 
two explanations existing in the literature. Using EVS data, this paper compares 
among host societies, and includes simultaneously much more countries of 
origin than previous studies. A deeper analysis of the interaction effects of the 
cultural gap between the host country and the country of origin, of the stock of 
immigrants in the host society, and of their overall connectivity to their country 
of origin add as novelty to existing literature. They provide empirical evidence 
for theoretical considerations around the structural conditions that may shape 
the dual impact of early socialization and later exposure to culture and institutions. 
The paper gradually builds the hypotheses. First it uses existing literature 
to describe how the social context in which one lives shapes one’s social trust. 
“Context”, in this paper, is not about personalized experiences, but refers to the 
continuous interaction through the social environment determines values and 
                                                 
10
 P.T. Dinesen, “Where You Come From or Where You Live? Examining the Cultural and 
Institutional Explanation of Generalized Trust Using Migration as a Natural Experiment”, 
European Sociological Review, vol. 29, no. 1, 2013, pp. 114-128. 
11
 Ibidem; E. Uslaner, “Where You Stand Depends on Where Your Grandparents Sat: The 
Inheritability of Generalized Trust”, Public Opinion Quarterly, no. 72, 2008, pp. 725-740. 
12
 P.T. Dinesen, “Does Generalized (Dis)Trust Travel? Examining the Impact of Cultural 
Heritage and Destination-Country Environment on Trust of Immigrants”, PoliticalPsychology, 
vol. 33, no. 4, 2012, pp. 495-511; Idem, “Where You Come From or Where You Live?...cit.”. 
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 P.T. Dinesen, M. Hooghe, “When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do: The Acculturation of 
Generalized Trust among Immigrants in Western Europe”, International Migration 
Review, no. 44, 2010, pp. 697-727. 
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behaviors. Second, the paper reviews the literature connecting social trust and 
international migration, and uses it to further refine the double-contextuality 
assumption. The section on data sources and methodological solutions focuses 
on computing indicators and overcoming the difficulties due to data availability. 
Cross-classified models produce the findings. The conclusion discusses 
implications for existing literature and for future research. 
 
 
Contextual Determinants of Social Trust 
 
Social or generalized trust refers to the extent to which people believe 
that unknown persons or other members of the society are trustworthy14. It 
indicates one of the varieties of trust, along with particularistic trust (referring in 
particular to status groups), and strategic trust (related to specific persons). As 
“the main component of social capital”15, trust is seen as an essential prerequisite for 
cooperation and as an expression of the propensity that one has to socialize. 
Considering the sources of generalized trust, one may depict two broad 
explanations16. They emphasize the role of initial formation, respectively the 
exposure to institutional influences. The first approach treats trust as a persistent 
cultural trait17 that is inherited or learned during primary socialization18. Trust 
can be conceived as a moral value19, or a general predisposition resulting from 
faith and knowledge. It derives from previous experiences, but it is also socially 
learned, it acts as a latent construct to direct attitudes and behaviors, particularly 
the ones related to cooperation, tolerance, and benevolence. This fits the broad 
definitions of social values20. Two important approaches are salient with respect 
to contextual determinants of value formation and change: socialization and 
institutionalization21. According to socialization hypothesis, the formative years 
are the time when one’s material conditions and social environment blend 
together to shape values, which remain stable over one’s entire life. A more 
                                                 
14
 E. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, cit.  
15
 K. Newton,“Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy”, International Political 
Science Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2001, pp. 201-214/p. 202. 
16
 P.T. Dinesen, “Where You Come From or Where You Live?...cit.”; D. Stolle, M. Hooghe, 
“The Roots of Social Capital: Attitudinal and Network Mechanisms in the Relation between 
Youth and Adult Indicators of Social Capital”, Acta Politica, no. 39, 2004, pp. 422-441. 
17
 R. Inglehart, Modernization and Post-Modernization…cit.; R. Putnam, Making 
Democracy Work…cit. 
18
 E. Uslaner, “Where You Stand Depends on Where Your Grandparents Sat:…cit.”. 
19
 Idem, The Moral Foundations of Trust, cit. 
20
 W. Jagodzinski, “Methodological Problems of Value Research”, in H. Vinken et al(eds.), 
Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective, Brill, Leiden, 
2004, pp. 97-121. 
21
 W. Arts, “Explaining European Value Patterns:...cit.”. 
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secure environment is said to lead to modern, or even late-modern or post-
material, values22. Growing up in a secure environment stresses higher-order 
needs, allowing people to be more open to change, more interested in self-
expression and self-fulfillment, and to put more trust in others.  
Despite its broad acceptance, the socialization hypothesis has to face 
strong criticism and amendments. Exposure to various contextual setups, for 
instance at the workplace23 triggers a learning processes which eventually 
determines value change. Acquiring knowledge transforms the sense of control 
and security that people experience. In the end, the feeling that one’s 
environment is controllable and predictable leads to social trust. Drastic 
transformations in social context, like periods of recession and increased 
uncertainty, also shape individual values, in a continuous adaptive process, 
“driving people to adopt those values that fit given external conditions”24. 
According to the institutionalization hypothesis, value change comes from the 
internalization of existing institutions25. They provide models that most people 
learn during their formative years and tend to follow their entire lives. Social 
institutions manifest their influence during adulthood as well, providing 
consistent guidelines along which members of a collectivity adjust their 
behaviors, needs, and values, including the tendency to trust others. Society as a 
whole is both a large reference framework and a large membership group. In 
order to fulfill affiliation needs, one may want to conform to its strong norms. 
This may be particularly important for international migrants willing to affirm 
their belonging to either their host or origin society. Repeated compliance with 
social norms eventually impacts one’s values26. Therefore, when everybody 
around trust others, this should be an incentive to start trusting. The opposite 
should hold true as well. 
This is consistent with the idea that “living in among trustworthy people” 
promotes trust27. The context tends to permanently shapes social trust as a 
                                                 
22
 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization. Institutionalized Individualism and Its 
Social and Political Consequences, Sage, London, 2001; R. Inglehart, Modernization and 
Post-Modernization…cit.; A. Inkeles, “Making Man Modern: On the Causes and 
Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries”, American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 75, no. 2, 1969, pp. 208-225. 
23
 A. Inkeles, “Making Man Modern:..cit.”, pp. 213-214. 
24
 R. Inglehart, C. Welzel, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development 
Sequence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 38. 
25
 W. Arts, “Explaining European Value Patterns:…cit.”; U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, 
Individualization…cit.; P. Gundelach, “National Value Differences: Modernization or 
Institutionalization?”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 35, no. 1, 
1994, pp. 37-58. 
26
 L. Newson, P.J. Richerson, “Why Do People Become modern? A Darwinian Explanation”, 
Population and Development Review, vol. 35, no. 1, 2009, pp. 117-158/p. 118. 
27
  E. Uslaner, “Where You Stand Depends on Where Your Grandparents Sat:…cit.”, p. 727. 
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product of institutional influences28, which provide patterns that individuals 
follow and internalize. 
The literature on social capital addresses the idea of “regimes of social 
capital”, of “cultures of participation and social cohesion”29. They create 
specific environments in which norms of participation and trust become genuine 
role models. Such cultures were observed in regions within a country30; internal 
structures of relations within organizations are said to depend on consistent 
patterns of sociability and trust found in various countries31; regions within a 
particular continent to differ with respect to social capital levels32.  
The discussion on institutionalization and cultural embeddedness of trust 
leads to the first hypothesis: (H1) When living in an environment rich in social 
trust, people tend to increase their own levels of social trust. The richness in 
social trust of a collectivity may be characterized by the average level of any 
social trust indicators, or, more simply, by the percentage of people who tend to 
trust others. Therefore (H1) states that the higher the percentage of those who 
trust others within the society where one lives, the higher the probability that 
the respective person will trust others. This might be particularly important, and 
easier to notice, in the case of immigrants: they socialize in a different culture 
and become exposed to the average levels of trust in the host society, that, 
according to (H1) start to change their probability to trust others. 
Considering both socialization and institutionalization, it results that 
social trust of each individual is shaped by two types of contexts. First, there are 
the formative years, when growing up occurs in a specific climate of trust, 
which is likely to be learned and internalized. The second hypothesis considers 
such dependency: (H2) When growing up in a culture rich in social trust, one 
has a higher propensity to trust others. 
(H1) and (H4) indicate a double-contextuality for social trust, which is 
easier to describe considering immigrants. They depend on the climate of social 
trust in their country of residence, as well on the one in their country of birth. 
The climate is defined by cultural norms of trust reflected in the average levels 
of generalized trust in their two relevant societies. 
                                                 
28
 P.T Dinesen, “Where You Come From or Where You Live?...cit.”; D. Stolle, M. Hooghe,“The 
Roots of Social Capital: Attitudinal and Network Mechanisms in the Relation between Youth 
and Adult Indicators of Social Capital”, Acta Politica, no. 39, 2004, pp. 422-441. 
29
 F. Pichler, C. Wallace, “Patterns of Formal and Informal Social Capital in Europe”, 
Sociological Review, vol. 23, no. 4, 2007, pp. 423-435. 
30
 G. Bădescu, P.E. Sum, “Historical Legacies, Social Capital and Civil Society: Comparing 
Romania on a Regional Level”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 57, no. 1, 2005, pp. 117-133; 
R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work:…cit. 
31
 F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Free Press, 
New York, 1995. 
32
 M. Paldalm, G.T. Svedsen, “Missing Social Capital and the Transition in Eastern Europe”, 
Journal of Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition, no. 5, 2001, pp. 31-34. 
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Social Trust and Immigrants 
 
A look on the literature that connects immigrants and social trust allows a 
further refinement of the two hypotheses. Empirical evidence is to be found for 
the dual dependency or one of its parts – either the impact of the host, either of 
one of the origin. Alesina and La Ferrara33 signaled the need to investigate the 
issue. Considering flows to specific migration destinations, scholars have shown 
that the culture of the origin country leaves a genuine “footprint” on 
immigrants34. Most of these findings are based on inspecting covariance at the 
aggregate level. Uslaner35 added individual-level determinants. Dinesen and 
Hooghe36 proposed cross-national analyses and included institutional 
trustworthiness of the destination society as a measure for dual-
contextualization. Bagno37 argued for the institutional explanation, asserting 
that the longer the stay in Germany, the more the migrants reflect German 
values. Dinesen38 and Nannestad et al39.successfully tested the transferability of 
the trust culture in the country of origin, also arguing upon the importance of 
the experiences and exposure to institutions in the host society. 
The above-mentioned papers converge on the idea that social trust is 
fostered both by the origin culture and the context provided by the host society, 
as stated in the two parts of my hypothesis. I contribute to this literature 
controlling for the dual-contextuality given by cultural norms of trust by 
increasing the scope of the analyses to a larger number of host and origin 
societies, and by refining the effect through several additional hypotheses that I 
introduce in the following. 
The culture of trust in a certain society may be indicated by the average 
level of social trust displayed by the members of that society. Strictly referring 
to immigrants, the above (H1) and (H2) hypotheses may be reformulated as: 
                                                 
33
 A. Alesina, A. La Ferrara, “Who Trusts Others?”,Journal of Public Economics, vol. 85, 
no. 2, 2002, pp. 207-234. 
34
 O. Bagno, “The Destination Does Matter”, Haifa: The Graduate Conference, 2006, 
http://gradcon.huji.ac.il/docs/19.pdf; T.W.Rice, J.L. Feldman, “Civic Culture and Democracy 
from Europe to America”, Journal of Politics, vol. 59, no. 4, 1997, pp. 1143-1172; S.N. Soroka, 
J.F. Helliwell, R. Johnston, “Modeling and Measuring Trust”, in F. Kay, R. Johnston (eds.), 
Diversity, Social Capital, and the Welfare State,University of British Columbia Press, 
Vancouver, 2006, pp. 95-136. 
35
 E. Uslaner, “Where You Stand Depends on Where Your Grandparents Sat:…cit.”. 
36
 P.T. Dinesen, “Where You Come From or Where You Live?...cit.”. 
37
 O. Bagno, “The Destination Does Matter”, cit. 
38
 P.T. Dinesen, “Does Generalized (Dis)Trust Travel?...cit.”. 
39
 P. Nannestad, G.T. Svendsen, P.T. Dinesen, K.M. Sønderskov, “Do Institutions or 
Culture Determine the Level of Social Trust? The Natural Experiment of Migration from 
Non-western to Western Countries”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 40, no. 
4, 2014, pp. 544-565. 
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For immigrants, the higher the average level of trust in the host society, the 
higher their propensity to trust; also, a higher level of trust in their society of 
origin would determine a higher level of trust among immigrants. Immigrants 
depend on two contexts. The first is their birth society with its specific culture 
of trust. Immigrants’ country of origin has a strong impact on them due to the 
social values interiorized during their early socialization. These values travel 
with them when they enter a host society. Controlling for individual 
characteristics, when in the same society of residence, immigrants from 
countries where people have a great deal of trust in others are more likely to 
trust others than immigrants from less trusting societies. The host society has its 
own norms and culture of trusting others. Once immigrants are exposed to this 
new culture, they adapt their own levels of social trust to accommodate those 
imposed by the local social norms. Since the host culture is salient in providing 
daily interactions, at least when considering things like meeting co-workers, 
shop-keepers, random people when using public transportation, and parents of 
the children’s colleagues, it is likely that the host culture’s norms will be more 
influential. Therefore: (H3) The effect of the host society’s average level of 
social trust is stronger than that of the culture of origin. 
If considering the cultural norms and the double-context involved by 
international migration, an important question is to which level one should 
locate the context. An average indicator of cultural norms in the country of 
origin reflects one’s formative heritage. The simple assumption is that the 
“average” culture has some impact on all members of a society. It creates a 
general context in which people have evolved. However, considering the 
cultural luggage that a particular migrant carries across borders, one may ask if 
the “average” indicator should not be further refined. Trust is not necessarily 
homogeneous within countries and can vary, for instance, with education. In 
this case, it would make sense to consider the average level of trust of in people 
from an immigrant’s country of birth according to education level as an origin 
context40. Values also depend on cohort41, and it would thus be logical to 
consider the average levels of trust of those with a similar education level 
within the same cohort. In summary, two types of contextual effects may be 
important: those derived from societal cultural norms, and the more specific 
effects consisting of cultural norms for respective education-age groups. The 
first refers to random daily interactions and shapes values as stated in (H1) and 
(H2). The second is likely to become more important when discussing the gap 
between the two contexts. 
The dual-contextuality may produce stronger or weaker effects depending 
on structural conditions in the two societies. There are migrants who frequently 
follow news and television from their home country and frequently interact by 
                                                 
40
  P.T. Dinesen, M. Hooghe, “When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do:…cit.”. 
41
 M. Voicu, E. Bartolomé-Peral, “Socialization or Context? Patterns of Support for Democracy 
in Spain and Romania”, Studia UBB Sociologia,vol. LVI, no. 1, 2011, pp. 95-113. 
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phone, internet, or in person with co-nationals. They will continue to be embedded 
within their culture of origin regardless of where they reside. Therefore (H4), if 
one’s connections with his/her society of origin are intense, one may expect the 
influence of that culture on current values to be stronger.  
In countries where migrants constitute a high proportion of the 
population, the collectivity is more likely to be diverse, leaving room for a 
variety of accepted social norms. Values of individual members of society 
would be less embedded in the social context of a dominant group, since it 
would be possible to find many such groups. For a specific value orientation, 
such as generalized trust, if the immigrant stock is large, one could expect to 
find a broader range of socially accepted levels that may be legitimated through 
cultural heritage (of origin). Individuals may opt for a reference group in which 
the norm is a high level of trust, but the opposite is also possible. In a trusting 
society, a large number of migrants would give citizens the opportunity to 
interact with more individuals from groups with higher levels of trust. If values 
are adaptive, and the variety of potential contacts increases knowledge about a 
variety of diverse groups which become predictable, the individual commitment 
to social trust would also be enhanced. In addition, the local culture, now more 
diverse, would become easier for any member of the society to accept, as it 
would be less likely to contain unfamiliar constructs or values. On the other 
hand, a small pool of migrants in a society that lacks trust is likely to propagate 
mistrust through daily interactions and contagion effects. Overall, a very large 
stock of immigrants would further enhance the impact of the host culture of 
trust on the social trust a resident in that society is likely to have (H5). 
Time spent in different contexts may also matter when considering 
exposure to the respective cultures. In other words, controlling for all other 
determinants, (H6) the longer one lives in a host society, the less he/she will be 
influenced by his/her culture of origin. Conversely, the older an individual was 
when migrating, the less he/she is impacted by the host culture. In both cases, 
the relation decreases in strength over time, and a logarithmic shape should 
therefore be considered.  
  
  
The Gap 
 
Immigrants are subject to favorable self-selection42. This makes themhaving 
the same dominant status that is reported to associate with high trust43. Therefore, 
the ones to travel from a culture of trust to another more likely to have higher levels 
of trust than their co-nationals, controlling for the individual characteristics. 
                                                 
42
 B.R. Chiswick, “Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?”, American Economic Review, 
no.89, 1999, pp. 181-185. 
43
 K. Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy”, International Political 
Science Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2001, pp. 201-214.  
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Putnam44 argues that “social distance” is something to consider when 
analyzing trust in people. In the case of migrants, this gap can be understood as the 
distance between the two levels of trust in the relevant two cultures (the trust gap).  
Let us imagine a person who grew up in an environment with a low level 
of trust and who now lives in an environment in which people promote and 
exercise a high level of trust in daily life. I will label such case as a “negative 
gap”: the place of origin is less trustful than the host country. According to the 
institutionalization hypothesis, the trustworthiness of the environment will act 
as a catalyst to increase the social trust of the person in question. This 
environment will also contain an important challenge. It is a highly different 
setting and therefore more difficult to control and predict than the person’s 
familiar environment marked by low trust. Random people with whom one 
interacts on a daily basis are likely to be more helpful in this new context than 
those in the individual’s place of origin (defined as a society with low trust). In 
low-trust societies, the expectation is that such interactions will more likely lead 
to harm than to help. Mistrusting others in the new context might be likely 
immediately following migration due to the complete lack of familiarity with 
the host society. However, it would soon become irrational; even very early 
experiences would show the migrant that the new society is at least slightly 
friendlier. This makes immigrants which are likely to have more trust than the 
average co-national, to come in an environment where their higher trustfulness 
becomes worthier, and where they experience positive-trust experiences that 
strengthen their social trust. Therefore (H7) a negative trust gap is likely to 
increase the odds of generalized trust. 
Now let us change perspectives and consider a person socialized in a 
society rich in social trust who now interacts with random people with low 
levels of trust on a daily basis. The new social context will fail to meet that 
person’s expectations, and his/her level of trust may decrease slightly. However, 
the effect is likely to be prevented by his/her initial supplementary trust that led 
to the migration, and the fact that the respective migrant may hold a better status 
in the host society. This further specifies (H7), indicating that, when comparing 
immigrants to similar natives, it is more likely that the negative gap produce 
effects, while positive cultural distances have less impact. 
 
 
Controls 
 
In order to avoid describing spurious relationships, control variables at 
both country and individual levels should be considered. I have already pointed 
to education as an individual predictor of trust. Better knowledge about a 
society, resulting from experiences involving direct interaction, is also important. 
                                                 
44
 R.D. Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century”, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2007, pp. 137-174/p. 159. 
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This may come from more frequent contact45, particularly within voluntary 
associations. Past negative experiences deter trust, while positive experiences 
reflected in higher levels of life satisfaction are likely to increase it46. Religious 
upbringing is another source of increased predictability as a general explanation 
of the existential order of things47. However, trust is a modern value48 related to 
a secular evaluation of the world, which, compared to religious faith, is more 
likely to allow a better understanding of others, regardless of their background. 
Trusting may be risky, and the risk is easier to bear when you are richer49.  
Individuals build their trust in social contexts that are safer, being 
wealthier and having lower crime rates, and which are less corrupt50. Since the 
impact of diversity is subject of a lengthy debate in the literature51 and 
immigration tends to increase diversity, one needs to control for the size of the 
immigrant group in the total population and for the ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic diversity of the host society. 
 
 
Data and Methods  
 
A comprehensive test of how international migrants change their levels of 
social trust when migrating should involve following them over a long period of 
time, recording how much trust they display at various moments before leaving 
their country of origin and after spending different lengths of time in their host 
society. One should also include a variety of origin and host countries, in order 
to appropriately assess the impact of the two contexts. Stayers in the origin 
societies should be included as a control group to ensure that change is not an 
inherent transformation of people in the corresponding country of birth. The 
same is valid for natives in the host societies with whom one needs to compare 
the migrants. I am not aware of the existence of such large-scale panel data. 
However, cross-sectional data allow immigrants from various societies to be 
compared to both stayers and natives.  
                                                 
45
 J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
46
 A. Alesina, A. La Ferrara, “Who Trusts Others?”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 85, 
no. 2, 2002, pp. 207-234; P. Paxton, “Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A 
Multilevel Model Across 31 Countries”, Social Forces, vol. 86, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-75. 
47
 P. Paxton, “Association Memberships and Generalized Trust:…cit.”.  
48
 R. Inglehart, Modernization and Post-Modernization…cit. 
49
 J. Delhey, K. Newton, “Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or 
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Table 1 
Variables in the Analyses 
 
Variable min max mean N source 
Individual level      
Social trust (dependent 
variable) 
0 1 30% 66603 
EVS 2008 
Age 16 108 45,5 67322 
Gender (1=female) 0 1 52% 67322 
Education 0 6 3,10 66781 
Religious faith 1 10 6,48 65068 
Civic participation 0 15 0,80 65914 
Negative experiences 0 6 1,08 67185 
Life Satisfaction  1 10 7,00 66755 
Income  1 12 4,52 55235 
born in another country 0 1 8% 67322 
time spent at 
destination (years)* 1 93 27,7 5015* 
age when arriving to 
host country* 1 93 20,8 5015* 
Trust distance origin-
host (DistTCg) 
-91 90 
-0,34 66746 
EVS 2008 & 
EVS/WVS 1999-
2009 
Trust distance origin-
host DistTCg* 
-91 90 
-4,63 4854* 
Negative gap* 0 1 61% 4854* 
Positive gap* 0 1 39% 4854* 
Host country    
47 
 
Trust levels (TCH) 5% 75% 30% EVS/WVS 1999-
2009 
Fractionalization 2003 0,04 0,75 0,43 Alesina et al, 2003** 
GDP per capita 2007 
(PPP, thou) 1,900 84,487 24,592 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) Immigrant stock, 2005 0,6% 43,6% 9,6% 
GINI 2008 23,4 44,2 31,2 WDI & Eurostat 
Corruption Perception 
Index, 2007 2,1 9,4 5,6 
Transparency 
International 
Origin country      
Trust levels (TCO) 5% 75%  29% 87** EVS/WVS 1999-
2009 
Remittances 2008 0% 50% 4,5% 130*** World Bank 
(2009)*** 
*international migrants only; **66865 respondents; ***63971 respondents. 
** A. Alesina et al., “Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growt, vol. 8, no. 2, 2003, pp.155-194. 
*** World Bank, World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary Fund's 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2008, 2009, Retrieved 25 October 2012 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/RemittancesData_Nov09(Public)xls) 
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The European Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS) 
suit this purpose. Both are well-known comparative studies that are fully 
described on their respective websites. EVS 2008 includes country of birth data 
for respondents from all European societies, except for Andorra, Vatican, San 
Marino, Monaco, and Lichtenstein. There are distinct subsamples for Northern 
Cyprus and Northern Ireland. There are 67.489 respondents residing in 47 host 
societies who were born in 144 (origin) countries; 5.236 of the respondents are 
foreign-born. There are least 20 of them in each of the host societies, except for 
Georgia, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. I use this dataset as raw 
information at the individual level. The respondents are nested in their countries 
of residence, in a multilevel setup. The country of origin provides another level-
two layer, that is not hierarchically related to the one defined by the host 
country. This reproduces the typical cross-classified multilevel design.  
The dependent variable is derived from the well-known general trust 
question, a dichotomous item which differentiates those who think “most people 
can be trusted” from those who instead believe that they “can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people”. For a majority of the respondents, the item taps into 
generalized trust52, but this seems to have slightly different meanings for some 
respondents53. Consequently, in some countries, mainly outside Europe, the 
measure overestimates social trust. However, it has the advantage of having been 
applied in a variety of countries, thus allowing for an effective comparison.  
Altogether, the 1999, 2005, and 2008 waves of the mentioned value 
surveys may be employed for deriving the indicator for cultures of trust in the 
47 host societies included in the EVS 2008 survey and for 91 of the societies in 
which the respondents were born. I use the same trust item to build an 
independent variable, at the country level, indicating the percentage of those 
who responded that most people can be trusted. This constitutes the trust 
context (TC). TC may be computed for the country of origin (TCO), for the 
country of current residence (TCH), or it may be specific to the age-education 
group in country of origin (TCOg) or residence (TCHg). In the latter case, 
education is coded as low (maximum lower secondary), middle (upper 
secondary completed), or high (university degree). Age is divided into four 
large cohorts, based on year of birth (before 1949, 1950-1964, 1965-1979, and 
after 1980). The intervals are chosen as such to make it possible to compute 
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statistics on social trust for the twelve resulting age-education categories. The 
distance between the two contexts is then given by DistTCg=TCOg-TCHg, 
computed at age-education level. If TCH directly measures the current culture 
of trust, TCO is rather a current reflection of the climate of trust existing in the 
country of origin during the formative years. Controlling for age and education 
only partially corrects for the imprecision of the measure, but the lack of 
comparative retrospective data makes TCO the best available proxy for the 
conditions during early socialization. 
Individual-level independent variables include age, gender, education 
(seven categories), relative income (12 categories), religious faith (how 
important God is in one’s life, 10-point scale), civic participation (number of 
types of associations a respondent belongs to), past negative experiences 
(experiencing divorce or loss of partner, the death of a child, the death of a 
parent, divorce of own children; divorce of parents), life satisfaction (10-point 
scale), being an immigrant (not born in the host country), age at migration, and 
time spent in the host society. 
Country-level predictors include measures of maximal fractionalization 
(the maximum value of the ethnic and religious fractionalization indexes), 
remittances as a share of GDP, international migrants’ share in total population, 
GDP per capita, and Transparency International’s corruption perception index. 
The reference years (Table 1) aim to be as close as possible to the period when 
EVS 2008-2009 was collected, taking into account the usual availability 
constraints. Gaps in the data were filled in using sources other than those 
indicated in the table. Full details are available from the author. 
Using the lmer package in R, I designed a series of logistic cross-
classified analyses, constantly adding independent variables to test the 
hypotheses. I started with models that employed the entire sample, including 
both migrants and non-migrants, such as to allow comparisons with stayers and 
natives. The first three hypotheses were tested using TCH and TCO as the 
independent variables. The fourth hypothesis required indicators for the 
intensity of contact of respondents with their birth society. Since the database 
does not provide such measures, I employed the share of remittances in the 
origin’s GDP as a rough indicator for the average tendency of those born in the 
respective country to maintain contact with their homeland. The implicit 
assumption is that the higher the remittances, the more the “average emigrants” 
from a specific country of origin keep in touch with their respective culture. The 
interaction effect between TCO and remittances provided a test for (H4). The 
interaction between TCH and the immigrant stock was used to validate (H5).  
To avoid eventual circular effects due to the computation procedure for 
the TCH, I repeated the models for the subsample of international migrants. 
This permitted the inclusion of the effect of age when migrating to the host 
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society, and of the interaction effects between TCH and age when migrating, 
respectively between TCO and the time spent in the host country. The 
interactions test for (H6). All models include the effect of the distance between 
host and origin countries, implied by (H7). 
I reran all models in two different scenarios. First, I excluded the 99 
migrants from China, Indonesia, Iran, and Iraq for which the TCO indicator 
might either overestimate social trust or be unreliable54. Second, since the 
dependent variable has a more homogeneous meaning within Europe55, the 
models were ran on the reduced subsamples of European-born respondents. 
For each variable, 2% or less of cases have missing answers. The 
exception is income, with more than one-fifth of the cases lacking information. I 
have run all models without this variable, and then, as a robustness check, I 
have redone the analyses including it as well. Listwise deletion was employed.  
 
 
Findings  
 
According to EVS 2008 data, across European countries, those born 
abroad differ little from native residents with regard to levels of trust. In 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, immigrants have less social trustthan native residents. In 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Kosovo, the opposite holds true. In the remaining 
36 societies, there is no significant difference between the two groups. 
However, there are large differences in average levels of trust: three-quarters of 
the Danes and Norwegians were trustful; the figure is lower than 10% in Cyprus. 
Table 2 shows the most important results. The first two reported models 
refer to the entire sample. The rest use the subsample of international migrants. Due 
to space constraints, findings from some models are only referred to in the text. 
  
 Table 2 
Parameters of the Models Predicting Social Trust 
 
M0 M1 iM0 iM1 iM2 iM3 
Individual level 
            
 
Trust gap 
(Origin-
host) 
Negative (distTCg<0)   0.25 *   0.30 * 0.29 * 0.29 * 
 
Positive (distTCg>0)   -0.14          
                                                 
54
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Size (distTCg)   -0.20    0.00  
-
0.08  
-
0.01  
Ln(Age at migration)       0.37 * 0.27 † 0.32 † 
Ln(Years in host society)        
  
-
0.03  
One year or less         -0.63    
2-3         0.14    
4-5         0.01    
6-10         0.30    
11-15         0.11    
16-20         0.14    
Origin         
    
Trust Culture (TCO) (%)   0.01 *   0.01 * 0.03 † 0.02  
Remittances(%)*100   -4.23 **   
-
0.80  
-
0.85  
-
0.72  
TCO*Remittances*100   0.15 *   0.04  0.04  0.04  
Host       
      
Trust Culture (TCH) (%)   0.03 ***   0.03 * 0.04 ** 0.03 * 
Immigrant Stock(%)   -1.63 **   
-
4.39 ** 
-
4.32 ** 
-
4.38 ** 
TCH*Immigrant Stock   0.04 *   0.13 * 0.13 * 0.13 * 
Cross-level interactions       
      
TCO*Ln(Years@host)/10       
  
-
0.05  
-
0.02  
TCH*Ln(Age@migration)      -0.01 * 
-
0.01 * 
-
0.01 * 
deviance 32878 29145 3045 2202 2195 2201 
variance 
host 0.566 0.004 0.456 0.054 0.054 0.054 
origin 0.066 0.002 0.059 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Sample 
 size 
Respondents 60494 60494 4443 4443 4443 4443 
Hosts 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Origins 87 87 85 85 85 85 
***p≤0.001; **p≤0.01; *p≤0.05; †p≤0.10. 
All models, except for M0 and iM0 control at individual level for: Gender, Age, Age-squared, 
Education, Religious Faith, # Memberships, Negative Experiences, Life Satisfaction. Corruption 
Perception Index, GDP/capita (logarithm), and Maximal Fractionalization were controlled at the 
host level. ‘Positive gap’ is the reference category in iM2-iM4. In M1 comparison is done to 
natives. In the upper part of the table, the figures are logged-odd ratios. 
 
The empty models indicate that variance between host countries is about 
ten times larger than that between origin countries, regardless of whether the 
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entire sample is taken into account or only the international migrants are 
included. To test the first hypothesis, stating the impact of the exposure to the 
culture of the host society, TCH is used as independent variable. (H2) assumed 
the socialization effect, implying that TCO should also determine individual 
levels of social trust.  
The first tests were already encouraging. For the overall sample, if adding 
only TCO and TCH as predictors, the variance computed at origin-level 
decreases to 0.006, while that of the host is 0.027. Compared to the empty 
model, the reduction is important, more than ten times in both cases, suggesting 
that TCO and TCH do contribute to explaining how much social trust an 
individual has. Similar findings result from the models that employ the 
subsample of immigrants. 
Moreover, the culture of trust in the host country maintains its significant 
positive influence in all the models, and proves to be an important predictor for 
individual-level social trust, regardless of which other country-level factors are 
controlled for. Trustful societies leave an imprint on their residents, whether 
they are native residents or immigrants. TCO has a weaker effect than TCH, but 
the impact exists nevertheless. Trustful countries of origin pack social trust into 
the cultural baggage of their emigrants. According to M1 results, an increase of 
one percent point of those who trust others in the country of origin leads to a 
direct maximal growth of 0.3% of the probability to trust others. A similar 
increase in the host’s culture of trust leads to a maximal 0.6% growth in the 
individual probability to trust. The discrepancy is larger if considering the 
models run on immigrants. For instance, in iM1, the maximal marginal effects 
are 0.3% for TCO, and 0.8% for TCH.  
The above computations of point estimates consider only the direct 
effects of the cultures of trust. However, all models include interaction effects 
that shape the impact of TCO and TCH. The signs of the two interaction terms 
included in M1 confirm hypotheses (H4) and (H5). The impact of the culture of 
origin is higher when people tend to remain closely connected to their home 
country. More exactly, as I have not disposed of an appropriate measure, this 
holds true at least when the “average” migrant from a certain origin keeps 
contact with his/her birthplace. In the models run only on the sample of 
immigrants, although the sign of the relation remains positive, the impact is not 
significant. The interaction between TCH and the stock of immigrants is 
significant when considering only immigrants as well as when comparing them 
to natives. In trustful host societies, the diversity brought about by a higher 
share of immigrants increases trust, probably due to better knowledge about 
non-similar people and greater familiarity with diversity. 
Considering the interaction effects, one may reassess the total impact of 
TCO and TCH. When, for the country of origin, remittances are less than 0.1% 
of the GDP, the point estimate of the maximal total effect of TCH is lower than 
that of TCO for hosts where immigrants comprise less than 15% of the total 
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population. If remittances are 0.2%, the effect of trust in the host society equals 
that of the origin only if immigrants are more than half of the population, a 
situation that does not occur in any of the studied European countries. The 
higher the remittances, the higher the total effect of the country of origin, which 
surpasses that of the host. However, these are only the point estimates. 
Inspecting the confidence intervals shows that in most cases the total effect size 
for TCO and TCH is similar. This changes only when remittances are higher 
than 2.5%, no matter the share of immigrants in the host country. In such 
situations, the culture of origin becomes salient in determining social trust. High 
remittances are also likely to indicate a large enough diaspora, with a higher 
probability that co-nationals are located in the same region of immigration. In 
such cases, migrants may have more frequent contact with co-ethnics sharing 
the same culture of trust, boosting the effect of the culture of origin. 
The models run only on immigrants allow further refinement considering 
length of exposure to origin’s and to host’s culture. Though the interaction 
effect of TCO with the length of stay has the expected direction stated by (H6a), 
this relation is also insignificant. On the other hand, (H6b) is supported: age at 
migration have a slight negative effect on the influence of the culture of trust in 
the host society. Older migrants are less likely to be influenced with respect to 
their values. 
One may reassess the relative impact of TCO and TCH also considering 
age of migration. Their relation will depend on the age of migration and on the 
stock of immigrants in the host society. For instance, if immigrating at the age 
of 25 to a country where immigrants account for 10% of the total population, 
the point estimate for the total maximum effect of TCH on the individual 
probability to trust others will be 0.55%. The corresponding figure for TCO is 
stable and equals 0.34%. If migrating when older, in a country with fewer 
migrants, the TCH effect becomes lower than the effect of TCO. Immigrating at 
the age of 40 in a country where the percentage of foreign-born in the host’s 
population is smaller than 7%, maintain the impact of the origin stronger than 
the one of the host. In other words, younger immigrants in countries where 
migration is prevalent are more likely to be influenced by the culture of trust in 
their host society than by that of their country of origin. Conversely, older 
migrants in countries with fewer immigrants have a higher propensity to be 
influenced by their birth culture than by their new society of residence. 
In all models, there are controls for the trust gap specified in (H7). Their 
effects show that when the destination is more trustful than their country of 
origin, immigrants are likely to display more social trust. Such migration may 
be seen as a huge step that involves taking a sort of bet that requires confidence 
as a prerequisite. It is also important to notice that the actual distance does not 
matter, and that only the sign of the gap is important. The effect is significant 
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both in the pooled sample and in the migrant-only samples.  
When not controlling for TCO and TCH (model not shown), the positive 
gap becomes significant as well. Specifically, when the host country is less 
trusting than the country of origin, the odds to trust others decrease. This 
suggests that these migrants also adapt to social context. As compared to what 
they have been used in their society of birth, they experience more frequent 
negative outcomes in their daily interactions in the host society and tend to 
accordingly adjust their level of trust. However, as mentioned, the effect is not 
significant after controlling for TCO and TCH. 
The impact of the presence of immigrants on the level of social trust was 
recently addressed in the literature with controversial findings56. Although the 
relation is beyond the purpose of this paper, the findings may help to understand 
the process that underlies this relationship. According to the models run on the 
overall sample, when TCH is lower than 33%, the total effect of the immigrants 
stock becomes negative. Otherwise, in cultures richer in social trust, the 
migrants seem to bring no harm to the propensity that a resident trust others. 
Therefore the impact of the presence of immigrants on social trust should be 
analyzed keeping under control the pre-existing trustfulness of the host society. 
All results remain almost unchanged when performing robustness checks, 
such as including income among predictors, restraining the sample to European-
born individuals, or removing some cases that might be problematic, as previously 
indicated. Thus, one can conclude that the findings are stable and can be trusted. 
 
 
Implications 
 
The analysis shows that social trust is both stable and adaptive. It 
simultaneously depends on the context of early socialization and on the current 
context, defined as cultures of trust in the host and origin societies. The 
influence of double-contextuality is shaped by structural conditions that exist 
both in the society of origin and the current society, as well as by an 
individual’s age of migration. This creates a complex and fluid social 
environment where change may occur more easily. 
The cultural gap of trust is not especially important per se, but rather 
through the pervasive influence of formative socialization throughout one’s 
entire life. This may contribute to the debate surrounding assimilation57. The 
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findings contradict the classical assimilation theory, showing that migrants 
remain influenced by their country of origin no matter when or where they 
migrated; however, in other respects, the findings also confirm the theory. The 
host culture plays a homogenization role, with various groups within society 
adapting their levels of trust according to the average TCH. This may be 
considered a sign of integration; if migrants do not adjust their levels of trust to 
the (superior) trustworthiness in their host society, this may degrade the overall 
level of social trust, thus hindering social cohesion and threatening the 
fundamental basis of the welfare state, for which generalized trust acts as a 
prerequisite58. Overall, the results are closer to a segmented version of 
assimilation, in which society is diverse due to diverse origins, but is somehow 
homogeneous due to the effect of the host culture.  
In the long term, I would expect European societies to change slightly 
under the impact of migration from various regions with lower levels of social 
trust. However, the change will likely be invisible and may not necessarily be 
negative. In less trustful societies, structural conditions, such as increasing 
migrant populations, will tend to discourage people from trusting others. 
Migrants themselves, even when the inherit low generalized trust from their 
society of origin, will be more trustworthy than expected due to individual 
characteristics, as a consequence of the fact that migration constitutes a wager 
of trust in the destination. On the other hand, if the trend towards reflexive 
modernity continues, one should also note that it comes with higher levels of 
generalized trust. Therefore, all of these tendencies may compensate for one 
another. Supplementary simulation should be carried out before finding a 
definitive answer regarding the impact of international migration on country-
level averages of generalized trust, considering the changes in migrants 
themselves, in the native population, and all transformations within the social 
structure of the host society. More, regions within the both origin and host 
societies may have slightly different cultures of trust, but currently available 
data does not allow such testing. 
Further attention should be also paid to the strength of the country of 
origin’s context. The gap might be larger or narrower depending on how much 
the society of origin continues to be a reference framework for the migrant. As 
argued, I have employed only a weak measure for immigrant embeddedness in 
the context given by the country of origin. Better measures would include 
frequency of in-group contact, exposure to TV channels from the society of 
origin, and the size of the ethnic group at the local level. The last indicator may 
already be available, and adding it to the databases provided by large-scale 
surveys is one of the proposals for future research. From a different perspective, 
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language proficiency or similarity of the known languages to the ones in the 
host society may be another mediator to boost the impact of the host and to 
decrease the influence of the origin. In a world of increasing free movement, 
including these other indicators should become a priority when designing 
comparative surveys.  
Fractionalization effects due to large numbers of immigrants in host 
countries are not supported when considering the above models. More precisely, 
they depend on the context and exist only in societies with levels of trust that 
are lower than 33%. When more than a third of the population is trusting, the 
implication is that the larger the immigrant population, the higher the level of 
trust of each individual. I would expect that, following the double-
contextualization argument, there is a need to control for fractionalization in 
both origin and host societies. Also, segregation and local conditions are more 
likely to produce effects as compared to country-level contexts59. This stresses 
the need to further extend the analysis by considering the structural conditions 
that exist at the local level. 
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